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Message: from Fabrizio Calvi  
in US intelligence and the Nazis  
Nazi (ref on the web)

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Tim Naftali

IWG.

Mildenstein wanted to establish a relationship with the U.S. government, ably with the CIA itself. He had visited the United States in July 1954. At request of an unidentified "foreign government"—probably the West German government—Mildenstein was granted a U.S. visa despite his known wartime association with the SS. In January 1956, Mildenstein himself approached the local officer at the U.S. embassy in Bonn for help in securing a U.S.-sponsored magazine grant for journalists. Although told by the State Department that "his background" plus the fact that he "was not an active journalist" made him ineligible for the grant, Mildenstein continued to visit the U.S. Embassy.<sup>23</sup> Finally, in May 1956, following his election to the FDP's press committee, he told a U.S. consular service officer that he had "useful and valuable information] . . . which he is willing to exchange for unspecified consideration."<sup>24</sup>

Mildenstein's interest in serving as a U.S. agent reached the CIA, and the Frankfurt office requested traces—a search for any relevant information—on Mildenstein from other CIA field stations and the headquarters in Washington. Local CIA officers already understood the nature of the man they were considering. Mildenstein was an "unsavory type," they cabled Washington, "probably has [a] continuing relationship with [a foreign government]." Nonetheless, a certain foreign government official who provided this information advised that Mildenstein was the type of man "with whom [a] coldly calculated business relationship" could be maintained "without undue operational effort."<sup>25</sup>

There was little activity following this request. The CIA station in Stuttgart advised Frankfurt that Mildenstein had been a prewar propaganda agent for newspapers in the Middle East, where he also wrote articles for the Nazi press. It noted some evidence that he had been in the SS and "possibly [the] SD," but offered no specifics. The trace request drew no other CIA comment on his SS membership alone any reference to the Jewish Affairs Department. Headquarters, it is noted, had nothing to add. In any case, the CIA station in Frankfurt decided not to pursue the case any further.

Mildenstein next turned up in Egypt working for the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. In December 1956, the Turkish press reported that he had been recruited by Egypt's powerful "Voice of Arabs" radio station along with other former associates from Goebbels' organization.<sup>26</sup> Mildenstein's experience in inciting riots against Jews in the Second World War was highly prized in Egypt. This was confirmed by a CIA report from Cairo, which listed him among a group of influential former Nazis who were shaping the actions of the Nasser government.<sup>27</sup>

It seems unlikely, given the released information, that the CIA recruited Mildenstein in Egypt or anywhere else following its brief dalliance with him in Germany in 1956. It was therefore with some surprise that the CIA learned in January 1960 that Mildenstein was seeking immunity as a U.S. intelligence agent. Frankfurt, whose personnel had changed since the last time that Mildenstein

had been of any interest, cabled Washington to find out whether he should be protected. "No indication [of] Kubark [CIA] interest since [redacted] 15 June 1956," Washington replied, and "unless further information is available [in the field,] no current HQS interest exists."<sup>24</sup> There remains the possibility that another U.S. intelligence service did have some contact with Mildenstein. If this happened—and Mildenstein was not simply blowing smoke in June 1960 to save his hide—then it was probably in Egypt, where the U.S. military attaché in Cairo was in contact with some of the former SS officers who were serving the Egyptian government.<sup>29</sup>

The CIA had reason to be concerned that Mildenstein claimed an operational relationship to weather the storm that followed the capture of Eichmann, but it had no reason to be surprised. CIA headquarters knew very well that the Agency had hired Nazis even more odious than Mildenstein.

**Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing**

When Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing heard the news that Israel had captured Eichmann, he contacted one of his former case officers in U.S. intelligence, who had since retired from the CIA.<sup>30</sup> Although he was a respected U.S. citizen with a good job at the drug company Warner-Lambert, Bolschwing feared the wrath of the Israelis. He told his former case officer that he might also be abducted. The retired U.S. intelligence officer, who had only a superficial knowledge of Bolschwing's actual career in the SS, could not understand his former employee's anxiety—it was inconceivable that the Israelis would try to snatch Bolschwing on U.S. soil—and so he turned to an acquaintance in the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff to learn more about him. Once Bolschwing's former case officer saw the captured German records found in the torpedo factory, he was shaken, saying that neither he nor others had known about Bolschwing's past, and asserting that "we would not have used him at that time had we known about it."<sup>31</sup> Some of what this intelligence officer did not remember knowing had been known by others in the CIA from the moment Bolschwing was hired.

*Bolschwing's Criminal Past*

The case begins in prewar Palestine, where in the mid-1930s Bolschwing operated as an SD agent, first undercover as a monk in Nazareth and then under commercial cover in Haifa.<sup>32</sup> His reports were sent to a bureau in the SD that studied the activities of Freemasons and Jews; under his friend Leopold von Mildenstein, this bureau was later transformed into the Jewish Affairs Department.

Born in 1909 the second son of Junker nobility, Bolschwing inherited only a facility with languages and an aristocratic demeanor. Anti-Semitism was not a birthright of Junkers, but it certainly would be expected of members of the Nazi Party, which Bolschwing joined in 1929. Bolschwing's anti-Semitism was largely a matter of cynical opportunism. Jews whom he later met in Palestine actually believed that he was sympathetic to Zionism, seeing in the establishment of an

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anti-Communist and anti-British Jewish state in the Middle East a useful ally for a powerful Germany."<sup>33</sup>

This period in Palestine brought the first stirrings of Bolschwing's enthusiasm for political operations. He tried to meet secretly with Arab tribal leaders to encourage them to assist the Jews in ridding the area of the British. Bolschwing hoped the Arabs would stage a diversion of their own to coincide with a Jewish revolt against the British authority.<sup>34</sup> Nazi Germany wanted to make Palestine ungovernable for Great Britain. Although the term had yet to be invented, the twenty-six-year-old Bolschwing was already aspiring to be one of his country's greatest covert operators.

When the British threw the meddlesome Bolschwing out of Palestine in mid-1936, Mildenstein brought him back to Berlin to assist the Jewish Affairs Department. Bolschwing refused to take a regular position in the office, which would have meant accepting an entry-level rank in the SS and respecting a formal chain-of-command. Instead he insisted on being named a consultant. This decision would later make it easier for Bolschwing to hide this phase of his career. At the time, however, it was seen as a sign that the young aristocrat was too big for his boots.<sup>35</sup>

Despite his haughty manner, Bolschwing worked hard to be relevant in the office. Only a few weeks into his new post, he produced a study of Palestine that attracted the attention of SS Chief Heinrich Himmler himself. Seeing that the office's principal concern was what to do with the Jews of Germany and less the future of Palestine, Bolschwing quickly showed that he could be useful in this regard, too. He drafted a policy document outlining how to solve "the Jewish problem."<sup>36</sup>

The document left no doubt where Bolschwing stood on the Jewish question. He advocated reducing Jewish influence in Germany both by forcing Jews to leave and by limiting the economic power of those who stayed. To get Jews to leave, Bolschwing advocated the use of terror:

A largely anti-Jewish atmosphere must be created among the people in order to form the basis for the continued attack and the effective exclusion of them . . . The most effective means is the anger of the people leading to excesses in order to take away the sense of security from the Jews. Even though this is an illegal method, it has had a long-standing effect as was shown by the "Kurfurstendamm riot" . . . Psychologically, this is even the more comprehensible since the Jew has learned a lot through the pogroms of the past centuries and fears nothing as much as a hostile atmosphere which can go spontaneously against him at any time.<sup>37</sup>

And if the terror proved insufficient, Bolschwing suggested the licensing of Jewish businesses as a precursor to their expropriation. Bolschwing's ideas echoed those of Adolf Eichmann and others in the department. When Austria joined the Third Reich in 1938, Bolschwing was invited to assist Eichmann in developing a program for expropriating Jewish property and forcing Austrian Jews to emigrate.

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In March 1940, probably as a reward for his work in the Jewish Affairs Department—which by this point had been transferred to the Gestapo under the command of Adolf Eichmann—Bolschwing received a plum foreign posting. He was named Himmler's representative in Romania, responsible for all SD activity in the country. The paper trail leaves unclear what, if any, political mission he carried with him. Bolschwing, however, acted as if he were in Bucharest expressly to enhance the power of the ultra-Fascist Iron Guard movement, which, despite the Fascist leanings of Romania's pro-German strongman Marshal Antonescu, had been shut out of any government positions. Initially, Bolschwing's efforts were greeted with success. In October 1940, the Romanian dictator Marshal Antonescu joined with the Iron Guard in forcing the Romanian king to abdicate. Certain members of the Iron Guard were then brought into the new government. Bolschwing's success was marked in another, even more pernicious way. Following this government shakeup, the Romanian government issued a series of anti-Jewish edicts. For the first time, Jewish property had to be registered. Having shaped German anti-Jewish laws and participated in their extension to Austria, Bolschwing was well suited to serve as the Iron Guard's advisor on how to do the same in Romania.<sup>38</sup>

Whether because of Bolschwing's advice or not, the Iron Guard subsequently overplayed its hand in Romanian politics. The relationship with Antonescu was never easy, but by early 1941 both sides understood that there was little reason to expect it to continue. When the Iron Guard struck first, Antonescu responded with military force. Bolschwing's immediate response was to support his clients. He moved the top thirteen men of the Iron Guard movement, including its head, Horia Sima, into the SD's residence in the German Embassy compound. Himmler supported the protection of the Iron Guardists, but the Hitler regime, in general, disapproved of Bolschwing's meddling in Romanian internal affairs. The Iron Guard rebellion was not in line with Nazi foreign policy, whereas the support of the existing Romanian government was considered paramount, especially in light of Hitler's plans to attack the Soviet Union later that year. Before the rebellion was put down, the Iron Guard gave the Romanian people a horrific demonstration of their hatred of the Jews. The capital's Jewish quarter was fire bombed. Synagogues were destroyed, and as many as six hundred Jews were killed, some hung on meat hooks in a gruesome attempt to defile orthodox butcher shops.

Bolschwing did everything he could to protect the perpetrators of the Bucharest pogrom. As he had argued in 1937, he viewed pogroms as useful tools to discipline Jewish behavior. When Antonescu sought to arrest Horia Sima, Constantin Papanace, and the rest of the men who had challenged his leadership and launched the pogrom in Bucharest, Bolschwing organized an operation to exfiltrate the men to Germany. He had to work quickly because the Romanian government wanted Himmler's people—especially Bolschwing himself—out of Bucharest. Before leaving the country, Bolschwing was able to

lay the groundwork for getting Sima and the others out. A few weeks later, the top thirteen Iron Guardsmen escaped from Romania via Bulgaria.<sup>39</sup>

Bolschwing's criminal activities, however, did not end with the protection of the leaders of the Bucharest pogrom. After serving less than a year in a Gestapo prison in 1942-43 (probably as punishment for his insubordination in Bucharest, or perhaps for some other reason), Bolschwing went back into the Jewish extortion business. He participated in expropriating from its Jewish owners a major Hamburg medical supply company called Pharmacia.<sup>40</sup> After stealing 20 percent for himself, he relinquished some control of the Vienna office of Pharmacia to German military intelligence for use as a cover.<sup>41</sup>



Otto von Bolschwing

#### *Bolschwing and the United States*

As the war drew to a close, Bolschwing understood that the days of the Thousand Year Reich were numbered. He needed to find a way to survive. His second marriage to an Austrian woman gave him an opportunity to reinvent himself. His new brother-in-law was a member of O-5, the Austrian resistance movement that sprang up in 1943 when the Allies announced that Austria would be treated as a separate country. In late 1944, Bolschwing, who had by now brought his family to Salzburg, began working for the O-5 unit in the Tyrolian Alps. For a less pliable man, the transformation from Junker aristocrat to Tyrolian underground operative would have been too difficult

to pull off. But Bolschwing played his new role so well that the leader of the local resistance unit would sign an affidavit attesting to Bolschwing's career in the Austrian resistance.<sup>42</sup>

Fortunately for Bolschwing, the first U.S. Army officers whom he encountered were in military government and not intelligence, for Bolschwing was not completely unknown to Allied intelligence. In 1940, the Poles had reported to their British allies on a Bolschwing, code named "Ossie," who was heading German intelligence in Bucharest.<sup>43</sup> This information appeared in the German primer, a biographic register of all known German intelligence officers, compiled by the British and shared with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the U.S. Army's CIC. Beside Bolschwing's name in the primer was the note, "traveled to Palestine in 1934 in the hope of discovering a treasure chest believed to have been buried by the German Army in 1918."<sup>44</sup>

The reference to Palestine was not the only indication in these early portraits that Bolschwing might have had something to do with the Nazi persecution of the Jews. At the end of the war, some other information emerged that placed Bolschwing as an advisor to the Iron Guard at the time of the pogrom. In August, 1945, a captured SS officer named Heinz Jost described him as a captain in the

who had not only been a leader and single-handedly smuggled Horst Heisterkamp's interesting tidbits aside, Bolschwing to the Allied counterintelligence command. No search was made for any relevant captives. He was sent to the field. Meanwhile, the tracing of him on its own. Instead of Bolschwing, which skipped over the

In April 1945, Bolschwing became a member of the 410th Infantry. There he cultivated a patron and protector, Lieutenant Colonel Goggin in the first of his testimonies to the United States during its advance prior to the surrender of the German army, capturing over twenty high-ranking officers with "leading patrols that led to the

Well aware of his own role in the war, he was eager to create a sense of obligation that would insulate him from prosecution. His greatest long-term value would be derived from his involvement in a contractual relationship. Bolschwing had tried for direct recruitment into the CIC, the immediate precursor to the CIA, but took a look at Bolschwing in recruiting.<sup>45</sup>

This initial rejection by the CIC did not end his charmed career. He usually made it through as an intelligence officer, American or otherwise, thinking that he was exceeding expectations. Bolschwing's facility with language, particularly French and English, was a major asset. But the CIC experienced an agent handler in Bolschwing and his colleagues in Heidelberg, a man found an unreliable man.<sup>50</sup> The CIA was that they did not bother to search strictly on what they knew of his biography. The CIA assessment of Bolschwing excepted on study of biography and self-seeking, egotistical; and a man

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SS who had not only been a leading player in the Iron Guard affair but also had single-handedly smuggled Horia Sima and the others to Germany.<sup>42</sup> These interesting tidbits aside, Bolschwing was considered a minor figure and no one in the Allied counterintelligence community bothered to investigate further. No search was made for any relevant captured Nazi documents, and nothing more on him was sent to the field. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army did not do any background tracing of him on its own. Instead it relied on an autobiography supplied by Bolschwing, which skipped over the years 1936-1940.

In April 1945, Bolschwing became "closely affiliated" with the headquarters of the 410th Infantry. There he cultivated a relationship with his first American patron and protector, Lieutenant Colonel Ray F. Goggin. Bolschwing wrote Goggin in the first of his testimonials, "materially assisted the armed forces of the United States during its advance through Fern Pass and western Austria prior to the surrender of the German Army." Goggin credited Bolschwing with capturing over twenty high-ranking Nazi officials and fifty-five officers and also with "leading patrols that led to the capture of many more."<sup>46</sup>

Well aware of his own role in the persecution of the Jews, Bolschwing was eager to create a sense of obligation on the part of Germany's new occupiers that would insulate him from prosecution. He worked for the U.S. military administration in southern Germany into 1946. Sensing, however, that his greatest long-term value would be in the field of intelligence, Bolschwing deftly moved into a contractual relationship with the Gehlen Organization, a U.S.-subsidized German foreign intelligence service under U.S. Army supervision.<sup>47</sup> Bolschwing had tried for direct recruitment by the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the immediate precursor to the CIA. But when CIG officers in Vienna took a look at Bolschwing in early 1947, they decided he was not worth recruiting.<sup>48</sup>

This initial rejection by the CIG would be an unusual event in Bolschwing's charmed career. He usually made an excellent first impression. Almost every intelligence officer, American or German, who encountered Bolschwing left thinking that he was exceedingly bright.<sup>49</sup> The impression was helped by Bolschwing's facility with languages: besides his native German, he spoke flawless French and English. But the CIG man in Heidelberg, Henry Hecksher, was as experienced an agent handler in Central Europe as one could find. Once he and his colleagues in Heidelberg and Vienna looked beyond the sales pitch, they found an unreliable man.<sup>50</sup> The key to their immunity to Bolschwing's charm was that they did not bother to socialize with him. Instead, they evaluated him strictly on what they knew of his Nazi career. In this spirit, a contemporaneous CIA assessment of Bolschwing explained, "Most evaluations of B (based without exception on study of biography rather than personal association) run as follows: self-seeking, egotistical; and a man of shifting loyalties."<sup>51</sup>

Bolschwing, however, was good enough for the Gehlen Organization, which in 1947 was expanding rapidly. Keen to acquire secret sources in the Balkans,

the Gehlen Organization hoped Bolschwing would be able to use his contacts to reconstruct the old SS networks, comprising ethnic Germans in Romania (*Volksdeutscher*) and Iron Guardsmen (or Legionnaires). He was assigned to a unit that specialized in operations in Romania. Bolschwing was one of several former SS men hired by the West Germans for this work in 1947 and 1948.<sup>52</sup>

Bolschwing was not especially successful as an agent recruiter for Gehlen. Despite their loyalty to him for his efforts in 1941, the leadership of the Iron Guard had little interest in working as intelligence gatherers for Bolschwing. Horia Sima and Constantin Papanace were more interested in fighting each other for predominance among the refugees of the Iron Guard movement than in making a small contribution to containing the Soviet Union. Within about a year, the West Germans realized that the smooth-talking Bolschwing was an operational blowhard, not worth the black market gas, cigarettes, and U.S. dollars required to pay him.<sup>53</sup>

Ironically, just as Gehlen was preparing to oust Bolschwing for poor performance, political events in Central Europe introduced a new factor that would bring the CIA, despite its predecessor's earlier misgivings, into the case. The surprise split between Stalin and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia in 1948 had created a possibility for agreement among the four Allied Powers on what to do about Austria. Since 1946, the talks had been deadlocked by Yugoslavia's demand, as supported by Moscow, for the cession of the southeastern provinces of Austria. But with Tito now considered an enemy, the Soviets announced in late May 1949 that they would accept the British, French, and American position on the borders of the new Austria.<sup>54</sup> While important issues still remained, there was reason to believe that an agreement which would end the military occupation of the country might be around the corner.

The prospect of an independent Austria forced the CIA to think hard about the future of its operations in the country. Since 1945, the U.S. civilian espionage services—the OSS, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), and then the CIA—had been the least funded and ultimately the least established of the agencies collecting intelligence for the United States in Austria. The CIC, though initially designated to follow matters of security, became the largest collector of political information. By 1946, there was yet another entrant in this competition. The Gehlen Organization was permitted to collect information in Austria on behalf of the U.S. military. The Gehlen Organization (called "Ausodeum") had extensive contacts in the displaced persons camps in Austria and among Germans who had fled to Austria from Eastern Europe.

In the fall of 1949, the CIA undertook a series of measures designed to prepare for the end of military occupation in Austria.<sup>55</sup> The Agency recruited Thomas Lucid, the former chief of operations of the CIC 430th Detachment, the main U.S. military security unit in all of occupied Austria.<sup>56</sup> The hiring of Lucid coincided with the initiation of a penetration operation to determine the nature of all CIC operations in Austria.<sup>57</sup> The Agency intended to keep those

networks that were worthwhile the rebirth of German national Ausodeum and co-opt some of CIA's Pullach base in Bavaria, p and Gehlen's agents in Austria come to Critchfield as a possible time. Bolschwing had been wanted to transfer from the G.

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to take a series of measures designed to be implemented in Austria.<sup>53</sup> The Agency recruited members of the CIC 430th Detachment, based in occupied Austria.<sup>54</sup> The hiring of a liaison operation to determine the results of the Agency intended to keep those

networks that were worthwhile and drop those that were not. Concerned about the rebirth of German nationalism in Austria, the Agency also decided to displace Ausodeum and co-opt some of its assets.<sup>55</sup> James Critchfield, the chief of the CIA's Pullach base in Bavaria, played a pivotal role in deciding which of the CIC's and Gehlen's agents in Austria the CIA would acquire. Bolschwing's name had come to Critchfield as a possible recruit to salvage from Ausodeum. For some time, Bolschwing had been making noises to the CIA station in Salzburg that he wanted to transfer from the Gehlen Organization to the CIA.

Once again Bolschwing managed to sell himself as a useful intelligence asset, though this should have been impossible. From 1934 through 1949, his intelligence career had amounted to very little. He had been thrown out of both Palestine and Romania, and he managed to so anger his own government that he spent nearly a year in jail in 1942-43 and was demoted to SS sergeant in 1945. What's more, he had produced very little for Gehlen. An ill-fated covert operator and ineffectual agent-controller, if looked at objectively, Bolschwing had little to offer the CIA. Moreover, leaving aside his questionable value as an intelligence asset, the man was a political problem. At the very least he was known to have harbored the perpetrators of three nights of terror, which left hundreds of Romanian Jews dead and their neighborhoods destroyed.

At this point, however, his value as an asset was not conceived in terms of his ability as an agent. His recruitment was supported on the assumption that he had access to large groups of Iron Guardsmen and Austrian personalities. Before giving his approval, Critchfield requested a detailed background report on Bolschwing. A short while later, he received a two-page document that retold the familiar tale of Bolschwing in prewar Palestine and a discussion of his role in encouraging and then protecting the Iron Guard in Romania.<sup>59</sup> In retrospect, this trace can at best be described as sloppy. The CIA sent information from only its field stations, along with what was readily available at headquarters; no one bothered to check the captured German records in the old torpedo factory in Alexandria, Virginia, to ensure that the CIA knew all that it could about him.<sup>60</sup>

Evidence of the connection between Bolschwing and Eichmann might not have automatically disqualified Bolschwing, but it would have raised hard questions about his truthfulness, since he continued to conceal his prewar service in the Jewish Affairs Department. Critchfield knew, and there was no dispute, that Bolschwing had advised and then assisted the perpetrators of the pogrom of Bucharest. Had the hint of war criminality been a litmus test of sorts for the CIA, this alone would have disqualified Bolschwing. The information about Eichmann, however, could have awakened the CIA to the fact that Bolschwing was a liar who was as unreliable about the present as he was about his own past. In September 1949, Bolschwing had written an autobiography for the CIA that did not mention his having worked for the SD's Jewish Affairs Department in the 1930s.<sup>61</sup> The field representatives did not push very hard to uncover unfavorable information on Bolschwing; they needed him to achieve operational changes in

Austria. Meanwhile, CIA headquarters was too busy or too uninterested to task anyone to do some digging in the files.

Even without the Eichmann material, the CIA knew that Bolschwing was notorious enough that he might become an embarrassment if some precautions were not taken. Bolschwing had never been formally denazified by a German or Austrian court. He was still maintaining that he had never actually joined the Party. Banking on his interrogator's assumptions about his previous life as a Prussian aristocrat, Bolschwing concocted a story that he had paid his brother's butler, who was a member of the Nazi Party, to retroactively make him a member back to 1932. The CIA in Pullach knew that Bolschwing's BDC file effectively discredited this story. These files showed that he was a formal member of the SS and had even been a formal member of the RSHA, which supervised his work in Romania.

The CIA station in Pullach decided that the BDC file had to be cleansed to prevent outsiders from using this information to undermine Bolschwing's position. In late 1949, Bolschwing claimed an expertise in Austrian politics and seemed to be viewing that as the next area for political action.<sup>62</sup> Early in 1950, the Austrian government was starting to ask questions about Bolschwing's status in the country.<sup>63</sup> Despite some misgivings on the part of the CIA chief in Berlin, Critchfield received the support of CIA headquarters and the incriminating files were removed from the BDC.<sup>64</sup> If the Austrians or even another U.S. agency asked for traces on the man, they were to be told that there was "no file available."<sup>65</sup>

In lieu of attempting to stop him from cleansing the Bolschwing files, one of Critchfield's colleagues in the field cautioned:

At the end of the war we tried to be very smart and changed the name[s] of several members of the SD and Abwehr in order to protect them from the German authorities and the occupation authorities. In most cases these persons were so well known that the change in name compromised them more than if they were to face a denazification court and face the judgment which would have been meted out to them. In the meantime, the developments in Germany and probably also in Austria have been such that membership in the SS, or in the SD, or in the Abwehr no longer is regarded as a strike against any personality. Since I regard it impossible to keep secret such associations, except in cases where a person was a clandestine agent of a given organization, I request you to reassess the advisability of withholding information available in the Berlin Documents Center.<sup>66</sup>

The moment the CIA acted to whitewash Bolschwing's past, this Nazi war criminal gained enormous leverage over the U.S. government. Given that he had worked for a wholly owned subsidiary of U.S. intelligence for two years, Bolschwing was already a potential disposal problem. But the fact that support was now coming directly from the CIA meant that Bolschwing could one day become a major political problem if not managed carefully.

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: 2001

From: PULLACH  
To: SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
Action: (S) (U)  
Information: (S) (U)

For Release Not Required

FULL C J  
TO: BULNF INFO: KA

1. AUSTRIA MINIST  
OF A.D. OTTO VON BOLSCHWING
2. IF NOT ALREADY  
IN FILE AVAILABLE
3. BOLSCHWING O.  
POSSIBLE PLANNING EISENHARDT
4. WE WOULD APPR

*We refer  
the beginning*

TO: BULNF INFO: KA

Cable suggesting that Austrian pr  
Someone at the CIA headquarters  
of all our difficulty." CIA Pullach  
263, Otto von Bolschwing Name



In an attempt to remove any misgivings at the stations in Berlin or Karlsruhe over hiding Bolschwing's SS personnel records, Richard Helms, the chief of German operations in Washington, had explained to the field that the secret had to be kept at least until August 1950: "Consider it essential [that] Usage [a Bolschwing code name] maintain [his] present position and freedom of movement. [The] [d]ecision to withhold or release Berlin file must be based [on] the consideration [of] which action [is] least likely restrict his activities [for the] next ninety days."<sup>67</sup>

Critchfield himself cabled to Washington in April that "[I] feel we should go [to] any length to help Usage."<sup>68</sup> Yet within a few months, Critchfield had evidently tired of Bolschwing.<sup>69</sup> The CIA Name File is silent on what Helms and Critchfield had expected to happen by August 1950, but whatever it was, it did not happen.<sup>70</sup> By mid-1951 Pullach had transferred Bolschwing to the responsibility of the CIA in Austria. "There appears to be little hope," Critchfield concluded in 1951, "that he will ever develop into a first-class agent."<sup>71</sup>

For CIA Austria, this second-class agent was now expected to revive the Iron Guard networks that he had once tended for the Gehlen Organization. Gehlen had closed the Romania networks in November 1951, perhaps under U.S. pressure, leaving the field wide open to the United States.<sup>72</sup> In January 1952, CIA headquarters authorized operational clearance for CIA Austria to use Bolschwing as a principal agent.<sup>73</sup>

Despite consistently underperforming as a reports officer and case officer, Bolschwing continued to be promoted. Part of the problem was that the people he encountered had little knowledge of Austria or Romania and therefore had no way of evaluating his material. Thus, the chief CIC intelligence officer James Milano, who saw what Bolschwing had given Gehlen, could tell Critchfield in all honesty that Bolschwing wrote the "best reports available [to the] USFA [United States Forces, Austria]."<sup>74</sup>

The last phase of the Bolschwing story holds an additional surprise. In 1953, a year into its new contract with Bolschwing, CIA Austria decided that it was time to close down his Romanian networks. But instead of merely firing him, the CIA station did something unimaginable. It chose to reward this incompetent by helping him achieve his long-term goal: the CIA decided to help him become a U.S. citizen.<sup>75</sup>

The CIA's continuing unwillingness to declassify operational details of the work done by the Nazi SS officers whom it employed after the war makes it difficult to determine the exact reasons for CIA Austria's blunder. Scattered comments in the declassified record suggest that Bolschwing had once again managed to convince some intelligence officers that he was a great political operative. In July 1953, CIA Austria recommended to Washington that Bolschwing be given U.S. citizenship so that he could return to Austria as a CIA officer.<sup>76</sup> Washington agreed with half of these recommendations. The CIA believed that U.S. citizenship was appropriate payment for "six years['] service" to the nation,<sup>77</sup> but unless "[a] more specific plan

were] presented for future work up was time to cut Bolschwing loose."<sup>78</sup>

The ease with which Bolschwing a study of its own. At root, the Immigration and Naturalization Service to permit Bolschwing to enter the excluded from the United States and belonged to organizations deemed obligations under the McCarran Act but when the CIA asked that the INS granted the visa.<sup>79</sup> "His entry was i of its files on the case later conclu on our behalf were of a such a na background as defined by the McC

Bolschwing's membership in t Bucharest were well-known facts citizen; the only real skeleton in l Eichmann in the Jewish Department with various American groups with had written documents for Mildred have immediately betrayed his cr official had ever bothered to ask l documents.

As the Agency was pressuring some final checking by CIA Austria Bolschwing in Eichmann's office asked headquarters to check with would have been solved immediately half-hearted. The CIA team in / become an American. Nevertheless Bolschwing underwent what app whether he had known Eichmann twice.<sup>82</sup> Bolschwing's effort at d the test decided to explain the en hiding only "a minor point," and

Thus, Bolschwing became a moment he left Austria, and the sorts died with his operational c After working menial jobs for a his charm into employment at ultimately becoming assistant to His interest in playing politics seeking a position with the pr

stations in Berlin or Karlsruhe. Richard Helms, the chief of the CIA, ordered to the field that the secret be considered it essential [that] Usage of the Berlin file must be based [on] only to restrict his activities [for the]

April that "[I] feel we should wait a few months, Critchfield had the file is silent on what Helms did in August 1950, but whatever it was, he transferred Bolschwing to the hands of the CIA to be little hope," Critchfield wrote to a first-class agent.<sup>71</sup>

now expected to revive the Iron Curtain: Gehlen Organization. Gehlen died in October 1951, perhaps under U.S. pressure. In January 1952, CIA ordered CIA Austria to use Bolschwing

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by operational details of the work after the war makes it difficult to consider. Scattered comments in the CIA file again managed to convince the CIA that he was a valuable operational operative. In July 1953, CIA decided that Bolschwing be given U.S. citizenship. Washington agreed with halfheartedness. U.S. citizenship was appropriate but unless "[a] more specific plan

[were] presented for future work upon return to Austria," Washington thought it was time to cut Bolschwing loose.<sup>72</sup>

The ease with which Bolschwing managed to enter the United States warrants a study of its own. At root, the Department of Justice, which oversaw the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), knowingly violated U.S. law to permit Bolschwing to enter the United States. The McCarran Act of 1950 excluded from the United States any immigrants who were Communists or who belonged to organizations deemed a threat to U.S. public security. In light of its obligations under the McCarran Act, the INS initially balked at granting the visa, but when the CIA asked that the INS "waive [its] objections," the INS did so and granted the visa.<sup>73</sup> "His entry was in effect accomplished," a CIA internal review of its files on the case later concluded; "by the CIA statement that his services on our behalf were of a such a nature as to override his otherwise undesirable background as defined by the McCarran Act."<sup>80</sup>

Bolschwing's membership in the Nazi Party and his wartime SD work in Bucharest were well-known facts among those helping him to become a U.S. citizen; the only real skeleton in Bolschwing's closet was his prewar work with Eichmann in the Jewish Department. For seven years he had managed to work with various American groups without the Eichmann question being posed. He had written documents for Mildenstein, Himmler, and Eichmann that would have immediately betrayed his true face. But until 1953, no U.S. intelligence official had ever bothered to ask him about Eichmann, let alone look for those documents.

As the Agency was pressuring the INS to bring Bolschwing into the country, some final checking by CIA Austria turned up two agent reports that placed Bolschwing in Eichmann's office before the war.<sup>81</sup> Of course, had CIA Austria asked headquarters to check with the archivists at the torpedo factory, the mystery would have been solved immediately. But checks on Bolschwing continued to be half-hearted. The CIA team in Austria had already decided to help Bolschwing become an American. Nevertheless, this serious lead had to be followed, so Bolschwing underwent what appears to have been a polygraph. Finally asked whether he had known Eichmann, Bolschwing lied and said he had met him only twice.<sup>82</sup> Bolschwing's effort at deception was detected, but the administrator of the test decided to explain the entire thing away. The conclusion: Bolschwing was lying only "a minor point," and it could be left at that.<sup>83</sup>

Thus, Bolschwing became a U.S. citizen. His work for the CIA ended the moment he left Austria, and the idea that he could become a political analyst of sorts died with his operational clearance. But Bolschwing refused to melt away. After working menial jobs for a short while, he parlayed his language skills and his charm into employment at the pharmaceutical company Warner Lambert, ultimately becoming assistant to the vice president in charge of foreign exports.<sup>84</sup> His interest in playing politics had not dimmed, however. By 1961, he was seeking a position with the predecessor of the U.S. Agency for International

Development. Having cultivated some politicians in New Jersey, Bolschwing got himself nominated to a State Department post in India.<sup>85</sup>

When Israel and the U.S. Justice Department did not go after him in 1960, Bolschwing thought the secret of his supporting role in the Nazi persecution of the Jews was safe. The CIA, however, understood that Bolschwing was a major problem. In 1961, at the height of the Eichmann trial, the CIA explained to him that although he had lied about his role in the persecution of the Jews, the CIA would not turn him in to the U.S. Department of Justice or to the West Germans.<sup>86</sup> He had become a potential political embarrassment, and the CIA wanted to hide its role in bringing him to the United States. However, Bolschwing was told that if questions were raised, the CIA would not lie on his behalf. The CIA did make one request of Bolschwing.<sup>87</sup> He was advised not to pursue the U.S. government job in India, and he complied. As a result of this understanding, it was not until the early 1980s that Bolschwing would finally be exposed by the Department of Justice Office of Special Investigations as the war criminal that he had long been. He was denaturalized but avoided deportation. He was already suffering from a terminal illness at the time of his denaturalization and was allowed to die in the United States in 1982.

#### Theodor Saevecke,

Unlike Otto von Bolschwing, Theodor Saevecke did not try to hide from his CIA handlers the fact that he was a committed Nazi. The initial phase in the relationship between Saevecke and the U.S. government remains unclear, despite new releases under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. Declassified CIA documents suggest that Saevecke was recruited by what became the CIA's Berlin Base (Kubark Berlin). The date of the recruitment is unknown; however, there is an indication that as early as 1946 Saevecke was under the protection of U.S. intelligence and that he was assisted in avoiding a British prison sentence for war crimes in 1947.

Born in 1911 in Hamburg, Saevecke joined the Nazi Party in 1929. He brought with him two years of experience as a teenage member of the Freikorps Rossbach, a paramilitary organization that terrorized German citizens in the Weimar Republic. After a stint in the German Navy, he became a criminal commissar, a Kripo (Criminal Police) officer in the storied Hanseatic League city of Lübeck with the mission of fighting "Jewish and Marxist" influences there.<sup>88</sup> He later moved to Berlin in the same capacity. At the start of the war, he was reassigned to the Sipo (Security Police) in Poznan, Poland, where he remained until June 1940. During this period he served at a concentration camp near Poznan, where he was one of three individuals authorized to approve executions of Poles, Russians, Gypsies, and Jews.<sup>89</sup> Returning to Berlin later that year, Saevecke remained two years before once again being sent out, this time to North Africa.

It was in Tunisia that Saevecke's SS career took off. He came under the wing of Walter Rauff, an SS Major who helped perfect the *Sauerwagen*, the execution trucks in which people were killed through the rerouting of carbon monoxide from

the engine's exhaust. Rauff had a dislike for Jews and his command during the 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa was the crumbling French North Africa. Tunisia into an Einsatzkommando, he used immunity from persecution, used Saevecke to round up Jews for mistreatment or murder. Saevecke served only a month before being sent north to Milan. Once again he was with direct administrative responsibilities.

In northern Italy, Saevecke supervised the Sipo and SD (in Milan, Italy) in resistance fighters. When he was in the village of Corbetta, he took up three men, none of whom were Jewish. One day, Saevecke accompanied Italian collaborators to Corbetta. The entire male population in front of the rest. The dwellers in Milan, following repeated attacks on fifteen political prisoners at Piazza Loreto.<sup>92</sup> Saevecke supervised the deportations to the extermination camps. He supervised the deportations of more politically versatile Jews to save them, Saevecke was April 1945 and the Final Solution, Saevecke deportations. After discovering Jews to save them, Saevecke it was April 1945 and the Final Solution, Saevecke deportations.

Saevecke did not try to hide from his CIA handlers the fact that he was in the SD.<sup>94</sup> Although he was known for killing Jews, he did not kill fighters, all of whom he told the stories of Corbetta. He was interviewed during his deputy's interrogation.

At this point Saevecke somehow managing to be recruited as agent "C". Whatever he did was very effective. Of his work, the CIA handlers knew that he was an unrepentant hankers back after the c